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MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
the evidence would inflict serious harm on the psychiatrist-
patient relationship. With this information, the judge would be
able to make a decision which would best serve the interests of
the defendant, the prosecution, and justice.
Jurisdiction: Constitutional Limitation on
Minnesota's Long-Arm Statute
Plaintiff, a Minnesota corporation, offered to sell defendant,
a foreign corporation, a truckload of eggs. Defendant's presi-
dent telephoned the plaintiff in Minnesota, agreeing to accept
the eggs and to forward an advance payment. Shortly there-
after defendant discovered a dispute as to the ownership of the
goods and stopped payment on its check. Although the de-
fendant neither maintained an office or place of business in
Minnesota, nor operated through agents or employees within the
state, similar business had been transacted between the parties
for a period of several years. Plaintiff attempted to obtain
jurisdiction by means of the Minnesota Single Act Statute.'
The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction. The Minnesota Supreme Court af-
firmed, holding that the defendant's contacts with the state
were qualitatively insufficient to support jurisdiction and that
1. MIN. STAT. § 303.13 (1965) provides:
If a foreign corporation makes a contract with a resident of
Minnesota to be performed in whole or in part by either party
in Minnesota, or if such foreign corporation commits a tort in
whole or in part in Minnesota against a resident of Minnesota,
such acts shall be deemed to be doing business in Minnesota by
the foreign corporation and shall be deemed equivalent to the
appointment by the foreign corporation of the secretary of the
state of Minnesota and successors to be its true and lawful
Attorney upon whom may be served all lawful process in any
actions or proceedings against the foreign corporation arising
from or growing out of such contract or tort.
The legislature has recently enacted a general jurisdiction statute ap-
plicable to both foreign corporations and nonresident individuals. Ch.
427, [1967] Minn. Laws 467; MINN. STAT. § 543.19. It is interesting to
note that the old statute (§ 303.13), which is dealt with in this Com-
ment, has not been repealed. Remarks directed to the constitutionality
and policy of the old statute should be equally relevant to the new
one. While the language differs, the constitutionality and wisdom of
applying either law in any given situation will be governed by the
same standards. For an analysis of the 1967 enactment, see Comment,
52 A.NN'. L. REV. 743 (1968). See generally Note, Due Process and
Foreign Corporations-The Minnesota Single Act Statute, 50 MTIN. L.
REV. 946 (1966); Note, Personal Jurisdiction in Minnesota Over Absent
Defendants, 42 MiNN. L. REV. 909 (1958); 48 MINN. L. REv. 192 (1963);
45 MnN. L. REV. 127 (1961); 43 M.[N. L. REv. 569 (1959).
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this deficiency could not be remedied by a showing of a contin-
uing series of similar transactions. Marshall Egg Transport v.
Bender-Goodman Company, 275 Minn. 534, 148 N.W.2d 161
(1967).
The constitutional limits of a state's personal jurisdiction
over nonresident corporations under the due process clause 2 have
been in a continuing process of expansion. The doctrine enun-
ciated in Pennoyer v. Neff, 3 requiring physical presence within
the forum for valid service of process, has gradually evolved
into the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice" test of International Shoe v. -Washington,4 requiring only
minimum contacts with the forum state to satisfy due process
requirements.5 In International Shoe it was stated that the
test should not be merely whether there was a little more ac-
tivity or a little less, "rather personal jurisdiction should de-
pend upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to
the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the
purpose of the due process clause to insure."6
Only twice has the United States Supreme Court subse-
quently dealt, in a significant manner, with this issue. In Mc-
Gee v. International Life Insurance Company,7 the Court found
the requisite minimum contacts where the only connection be-
tween the defendant and the forum state was the solicitation
and sale of a single contract of insurance through the mail.
The Court found that the requirements of International Shoe
were satisfied because the suit was based on a contract which
had a substantial connection with the forum.-
While McGee gave considerable impulse to the expansive
trend in state court jurisdiction, Hanson v. Denckla9 made it
clear that there were some limits to which the Supreme Court
would continue to adhere. In Hanson, Florida attempted to ex-
ercise jurisdiction over a Delaware corporate trustee whose
only connection with the forum state was that the settlor and
some of the beneficiaries of the trust had become domiciliaries
of the forum state subsequent to the execution of the trust in-
strument.10 The Court refused to sustain jurisdiction holding
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
3. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
4. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5. Id. at 316.
6. Id. at 319.
7. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
8. Id. at 223.
9. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
10. Id. at 251-52.
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that there must be some act by which the defendant purposely
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.1
From these pronouncements of the Supreme Court there has
emerged a rather tentative enumeration of the factors which are
to be considered in determining whether the fair play and
substantial justice test has been met. Among these are: (1) the
interest of the forum in providing effective means of redress
for its residents; (2) the inconvenience to the nonresident if
he is required to defend in the forum state; (3) the nature and
quality of the defendant's contacts; and (4) the relationship
between the cause of action and the contacts. 12
Most of the states,'3 including Minnesota, 14 have enacted
"long-arm" statutes to take full advantage of the liberalization
of the due process requirements for exercising jurisdiction. How-
ever, such jurisdictions have been more willing to exercise juris-
diction in tort cases than in contract actions, since the state
arguably has a greater interest in protecting its citizens from
physical injury than from "injuries" arising out of contractual
difficulties. Nevertheless, the original Minnesota long arm
statute, providing in part that a foreign corporation is deemed
to be doing business in Minnesota for jurisdictional purposes
when it makes a contract with a resident to be performed in
whole or in part in Minnesota, was successfully used a number
of times.' 5
The problem of a resident seller attempting to obtain juris-
diction over an out-of-state buyer under the single act statute
has twice before been dealt with by the Minnesota Supreme
Court. In Dahlberg Company v. Western Hearing Aid Center,
Limited,'0 a contract for the sale of merchandise was executed
in Minnesota, the goods were manufactured in the state, promis-
sory notes were executed by the defendant in Minnesota, and
11. Id. at 253.
12. See generally Comment, 40 TUL. L. REV. 366, 368 (1965); 51
VA. L. REv. 719 (1965).
13. For a recent compilation see 51 VA. L. Rzv., note 12 supra, at
719 n.4.
14. MmN. STAT. § 303.13 (1965).
15. E.g., Adamek v. Michigan Door Co., 260 Minn. 54, 108 N.W.2d
607 (1961) (tort actions); The Dahlberg Co. v. Western Hearing Aid
Center, 259 Minn. 330, 107 N.W.2d 381 (1961) (contract actions); Atkins
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960);
Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959).
16. 259 Minn. 330, 107 N.W.2d 381 (1961).
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agents of the defendant entered Minnesota in connection with
performance of the contract. The court found that these facts
constituted the requisite minimum contacts to support jurisdic-
tion. In support of its position the Dahlberg court noted that
the defendant had access to the Minnesota courts to enforce
any rights arising from the transact ion, and that there was no
greater burden upon the defendant in having to defend the action
in Minnesota than there would be upon the plaintiff were it
forced to bring an action elsewhere.
In Fourth Northwestern National Bank v. Hilson Industries,
Inc.,17 the resident plaintiff went to the buyer's state to nego-
tiate and sign the contract, and to engage in discussions con-
cerning a settlement. The action was based on a series of notes
which were made outside the state but payable in Minnesota.
The supreme court refused to sustain jurisdiction, distinguish-
ing those cases in which the long-arm statute had been suc-
cessfully invoked by noting that in each of them the nonresi-
dent defendant was, in a sense, an aggressor. In each of the
distinguished cases there was a substantial contact with the
forum such that it could be said that defendant had exercised
the privilege of doing business in Minnesota and thus subjected
itself to jurisdiction.' 8
In the instant case the trial court and the Minnesota Su-
preme Court both depended exclusively upon Hilson Industries.
The supreme court summarily found that it would be unjust
to impose jurisdiction on the defendant on the basis of its meager
contact with Minnesota.' 9 The court flatly refused to consider
as relevant the fact that the transaction which gave rise to the
controversy was not an isolated act, but one of a series of simi-
lar transactions which had taken place over a period of several
years.2 0 The decision appeared to be based upon the assumption
that only the "quality" of the single transaction giving rise to
the controversy sued upon should be considered in determining
whether a jurisdictional basis exists.
However, the decision in Marshall Egg is ambiguous as to
whether it is based upon considerations of policy or of consti-
tutional law. In order to analyze the court's holding, it is first
necessary to determine whether it would have been constitu-
tionally permissible to exercise jurisdiction under the applicable
17. 264 Minn. 110, 117 N.W.2d 732 (1962).
18. Id. at 115, 117 N.W.2d at 735.
19. 275 Minn. 534, 538, 148 N.W.2d 161, 164 (1967).
20. Id.
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standards of the United States Supreme Court.
It has generally been assumed that the act of buying by a
nonresident is considerably less significant from a jurisdictional
viewpoint than is a similar transaction where the foreign de-
fendant is a seller.21 This premise was adopted by the Min-
nesota court in Hilson Industries.22 There is support for this
distinction in the language of Hanson v. Denckla2 3 which indi-
cates that a jurisdictional act must be in the nature of the exer-
cise of a privilege.24 The common conception would seem to be
that it is a greater privilege to sell than to purchase, because in
the isolated transaction it is often true that the seller has an
immediate monetary gain, whereas the buyer does not. In such
instances, the seller is usually thought of as the initiator or
aggressor.25
Assuming that the act of buying within the forum state is
less significant than the act of selling, it does not necessarily
follow that it is of no jurisdictional relevance. Although the
Minnesota court indicated in the instant case that it will look
only to the "quality and nature" of the single transaction out of
which the controversy before the court arises, this position is
not supported by the case law. Hanson v. Denckla,26 upon which
the MAnnesota court depended in Hilson Industries (and, by im-
plication, in Marshall Egg), stands for the proposition that the
defendant must engage in a volitional act by which it can be
said that he has placed himself within the jurisdiction of the
forum state.2 7  In Hanson the sole connection of the defendant
trustee with the state seeking jurisdiction was the act of a per-
son over whom defendant had no control. In the case of a
nonresident buyer, however, there is no such objection since the
buyer himself purposely initiates a contact with the forum state.
Thus, it would appear that the principles of Hanson do not pre-
clude the exercise of jurisdiction under the instant facts.
21. Cf. Waltham Precision Instrument Co. v. McDonnell Aircraft
Corp., 310 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1962).
22. 264 Minn. 110, 116, 117 N.W.2d 732, 735 (1962).
23. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
24. Id. at 253.
25. This common, intuitive analysis ignores the fact that a buyer
may subsequently use or resell the article at a substantial profit. Nev-
ertheless, as a matter of common experience, it is the seller who seeks
the buyer.
26. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
27. Id. at 251-52; see 43 MiNN. L. REV. 569, 572 (1959). Compare
Parmalee v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 206 F.2d 518 (5th Cir.
1953), with Parmalee v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 206
F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1953).
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The refusal of the Minnesota court to permit the exercise of
jurisdiction in Marshall Egg was probably based upon the dec-
laration in International Shoe that the test of jurisdiction is
not to be based upon the quantity of the acts involved, but
rather upon the quality and nature of such activity in relation
to the fair and orderly administration of justice.28 In Marshall
Egg the court explicitly refused to recognize any jurisdictional
relevance in the fact that there was a continuing series of similar
transactions between the parties rather than a single buying
transaction. But it would seem extremely doubtful that the
Supreme Court intended in International Shoe totally to exclude
quantity of contacts as a criterion of due process. The law of
personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations prior to that case
required physical presence within the forum state, as evidenced
by continuous and systematic activities.29  The apparent ob-
jective of the Court in International Shoe was to initiate a
relaxation of due process standards. The Court desired to indi-
cate that the criteria cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative
but must also be based on the quality and nature of the ac-
tivity.30 Indeed, in applying its newly enunciated standards in
International Shoe itself, the Court specifically relied upon the
fact that the activities of the defendant were neither irregular
nor casual, but were systematic and continuous throughout the
years in question.3 1 Moreover, the state and lower federal courts
have both implicitly and explicitly regarded the quantity of con-
tacts as constitutionally significant.32: In its previous decisions
the Minnesota Supreme Court had given clear indications that it
28. Although International Shoe is not cited in the instant case,
the language used by the court in the last substantive paragraph of its
opinion clearly indicates that this is what the court had in mind. 275
Minn. 534, 538, 148 N.W.2d 161, 163 (1967).
29. See International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914);
see also International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
30. 326 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1945).
31. Id. at 320; see Note, Personal Jurisdiction in Minnesota Over
Absent Defendants, 42 MXm. L. REV. 909, 913 (1958).
32. E.g., Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir.
1965); Waltham Precision Instrument Co. v. McDonnell Aircraft Corp.,
310 F.2d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 1962); Pappas v. Steamship Aristidis, 249
F. Supp. 692, 694 (E.D. Va. 1965).
A California court has explicitly held that "there is no distinction
for jurisdictional purposes between regular selling and regular buying."
Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 859, 323
P.2d 437, 440 (1958). The court specifically found that a regular
course of purchasing activities in a fact situation similar to Marshall
Egg provided a jurisdictional basis sufficient to comport with the
standards of International Shoe. Id. at 861, 323 P.2d at 441.
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would also look to quantity of contacts,3 3 and the federal courts
which have dealt with the Minnesota Single Act Statute have
done likewise.
34
As has been noted, one of the factors relevant to the consti-
tutional issue is the degree of inconvenience and expense to
which the defendant would be exposed by being required to
defend outside his own jurisdiction.3 5 While the court did not
discuss this problem in the instant case, there was nothing in
the opinion which revealed any undue burden upon the de-
fendant if it were required to defend in Minnesota. It is un-
likely that the defendant would experience any more incon-
venience than would the plaintiff were it forced to travel to
New York.30
The foregoing indicates that it was possible from a constitu-
tional standpoint for the Minnesota court to have allowed the
exercise of jurisdiction in Marshall Egg.37 It is at least appar-
ent that if the case was to have been decided on the basis of
constitutional issues, the premises of the decision merited a more
detailed discussion than they were given.
It is possible that the failure of the court to uphold juris-
diction in Marshall Egg was based upon an undefined mixture
of constitutional and policy considerations. At one point in the
opinion the court mentioned that it would be "harsh justice"
to impose jurisdiction, and that "something more should exist
33. In Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959), the
Minnesota Supreme Court stated: "It seems only fair to permit one
who has suffered a wrong at the hands of a resident of a foreign state
to sue in his own state irrespective of whether he can show multiple
transactions or not." Id. at 553, 99 N.W.2d at 676 (emphasis added). In
Hilson Industries the court distinguished Dahlberg on grounds that in
the latter "there was an extended course of dealings between the con-
cerns and a close business relationship." 264 Minn. 110, 116, 117 N.W.2d
732, 735 (1962).
34. Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir.
1965); Bonhiver v. Louisiana Brokers Exch., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 254 (D.
Minn. 1966).
35. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 224 (1957);
Fourth Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Indus., 264 Minn. 110, 117 N.W.
2d 732 (1962).
36. Perhaps one reason the court is more willing to allow juris-
diction in a case like Dahlberg, where the nonresident buyer physically
entered the state, is that since defendant came to the state for business
purposes, it is not unreasonable to expect him to return for a related
purpose. Cf. Bonhiver v. Louisiana Brokers Exch., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 254
(D. Minn. 1966).
37. See Henry R. Jahn & Son, Inc. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d
855, 323 P.2d 437 (1958).
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before jurisdiction should be imposed."38  This language at
least suggests that the court was concerned with the wisdom
rather than the constitutionality of exercising jurisdiction. This
conclusion is buttressed by the language in Hilson which ex-
pressed concern that an over-willingness to impose jurisdiction
on out-of-state buyers might result in discouraging them from
transacting business in MVinnesota. 39
Further, the opinion expressed a concern as to which party
was the aggressor.40  While the term "aggressor" has never
been explicitly defined, it appears to refer to the party who is the
instigator of the contact, or who is in some sense taking advan-
tage of the other party.41 In the ordinary sale transaction, where
the nonresident seller has made an affirmative effort to sell its
product to a resident plaintiff, the Minnesota court has had little
hesitation in upholding jurisdiction.4' However, where the de-
fendant is an out-of-state buyer, it is more difficult to conceive of
it as an aggressor, as, in the general case, its patronage will have
been solicited by the resident seller.43 It may have appeared to
the Minnesota Supreme Court that an out-of-state buyer will not
have made the kind of affirmative, purposeful contact that Han-
38. 275 Minn. 534, 537-38, 148 N.W.2d 161, 164 (1967) (emphasis
added).
39. 264 Minn. 110, 117-18, 117 N.W.2d 732, 736 (1962). However,
the concluding substantive paragraph of the opinion speaks in terms of
the quality and nature of the acts of the defendant. As has been indi-
cated these words are a part of the constitutional test for due process
enunciated in International Shoe.
Many state court decisions are similarly ambiguous. See, e.g., Gro-
bark v. Addo Machine Co., Inc., 16 ll. 2d 426, 158 N.E.2d 73 (1959);
Comment, 51 VA. L. REv. 719, 735 (1965). Federal court decisions more
often make explicit distinctions between considerations of policy, statu-
tory interpretation and constitutional law. This is perhaps due to their
reluctance to reach constitutional issues unless necessary.
40. 275 Minn. 534, 537, 148 N.W.2d 161, 164 (1967).
41. Fourth Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Indus., 264 Minn.
110, 117, 117 N.W.2d 732, 735 (1962).
42. E.g., Beck v. Spindler, 256 Mim. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959).
43. The "aggressor theory" does not appear to be entirely coinci-
dent with the question of which party made the first contact, or was
the instigator of the relationship. In Hilson Industries it was the
defendant which made the first contact, but the plaintiff was portrayed
as the aggressor. It is possible that the concept of "aggressor" in-
volves an evaluation of which person is the defaulting party. Clearly
such a determination has no bearing upon the question of jurisdiction.
Cf. United Barge Co. v. Logan Charter Serv., Inc., 237 F. Supp. 624,
631 (D. Minn. 1964).
Nevertheless, it is possible that the nonresident buyer could be an
"aggressor." For example, the buyer could accrue an appreciable
amount of indebtedness to the resident seller, and then refuse to pay.
[Vol. 52:698
MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
son v. Denckla requires. The "aggressor theory," however, does
not seem to have any valid constitutional basis. The Minnesota
Federal District Court has twice stated that it finds no signifi-
cance in which party makes the first contact or is the aggressor.4 4
Regardless of the validity of this position in the case of a single
buying transaction, where there has been a regular course of
dealings, it is clear that the defendant buyer has made a deci-
sion to continue to have contacts with the jurisdiction. Clearly
this should satisfy the constitutional requirement.
The Court may also have been influenced in its decision by
a conception of the policy objective of the Single Act Statute to
protect individuals rather than corporations. The statute was un-
doubtedly designed to protect small individual claimants who
would be financially unable to pursue their claims in a foreign
jurisdiction.45 But the statute as written by the legislature makes
no distinction between the rights of resident individuals and
resident corporations. If there is no constitutional basis for
making such a distinction, there is arguably no room for the
court to interpolate it into the statute.
It has been suggested that since the determination of con-
sistency with due process in a single act case is a matter of
balancing the various interests of the plaintiff, the defendant,
and the forum state, the plaintiff's being an individual rather
than a corporation ought to be significant. Arguendo, where an
individual is involved the state perhaps has a greater interest
in exercising jurisdiction in order to better protect its citizens.
Hilson Industries has been read as implying such an attitude on
the part of the Minnesota Supreme Court,46 and it is arguable
that this position is consistent with the basic jurisdictional stand-
ards of fair play and substantial justice as set forth in Interna-
tional Shoe. Perhaps it is more consonant with fairness and
reason to impose jurisdiction on a nonresident where the plain-
tiff is an individual, but this is a fact determination which must
be made in each case. In Marshall Egg, where both parties
are corporations, such considerations regarding policy would ap-
44. Bonhiver v. Louisiana Brokers Exch., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 254,
258 (D. Minn. 1966); Kornfuehrer v. Philadelphia Bindery, Inc., 240
F. Supp. 157, 160-61 n.7 (D. Minn. 1965).
45. See Comment, 48 MnqN. L. R.v. 119, 192, 194 (1963).
46. Haldeman-Homme Mfg. Co. v. Texacon Indus. Inc., 236 F.
Supp. 99, 102n.5 (D. Minn. 1964). Cf. Comment, 43 Alu. L. REv.
569, 576 (1959).
Such an attitude with regard to policy may also be relevant to the
constitutional question involved.
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